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This article explains how confidential information in the engineering industry can be 
protected by the common law action of breach of confidence and by confidentiality (secrecy) 
clauses in contract law. First the article discusses breach of confidence, examining cases such 
as Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 and 
Surveys & Mining Ltd v Morrison [1967] VR 37. Then it discusses confidentiality clauses in 
contracts, and considers the nullifying effect of the doctrine of restraint of trade, looking at 
recent decisions such as Maggbury v Hafele (2001) 210 CLR 181 and AIM Maintenance v 




To say that trade secrets have enormous economic value 
is trite, but many companies find to their cost that either 
they have not taken sufficient steps to protect their 
secrets, or the steps they have taken are unenforceable 
in a court of law. Breach of confidence is a legal action 
that recognises the economic value of information, and 
is relevant to the engineering industry because it 
protects all manner of trade secrets. As the name would 
indicate, it provides some protection to the holder of 
valuable information, the value of which will be lost if 
the information becomes public. The modern law of 
breach of confidence can be said to have started in 1948 
with the decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering 
Co Ltd.1 The Saltman Engineering case is important 
because, prior to this, there was some argument that 
there must be a contract between the parties before 
liability for breach of confidence would exist. Saltman 
Engineering made it clear that breach of confidence is a 
distinct cause of action and liability exists quite 
separately from any other legal action. 
                                                 
                                                
1 (1948) 65 RPC 203. The facts of the case will be discussed 
in more detail later. 
 
Confidentiality or secrecy clauses are those which an 
engineering company should consider inserting into any 
contract between the company and its employees, or its 
suppliers, joint venture partners, sub-contractors and so 
on. These clauses stipulate that the contracting party 
must not divulge certain information to third parties. 
These clauses must, however, be carefully worded in 
order to be valid because if they are expressed too 
widely the courts will strike them down (make them 
ineffective) if they are held to be a ‘restraint of trade’.2
 
This article first discusses breach of confidence, then it 
discusses confidentiality clauses in contracts, and 
considers the nullifying effect of the doctrine of restraint 
of trade. 
 
Breach of confidence 
 
2 The standard form contract used most often in engineering 
construction is AS (Australian Standards) 2124-1992. Clause 
13 of this contract, headed ‘Patents, copyright and other 
intellectual property rights’, requires the parties not to do 
anything which may infringe these rights. ‘Confidentiality’ 
will be implied under this clause. 
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There are four main classes of information covered by 
breach of confidence, although these may overlap to 
some extent.3 The categories are personal information, 
such as marital secrets,4 government information, such 
as tax office information or Cabinet discussions, artistic 
and literary secrets, such as the idea for a series of 
television programs,5 and trade secrets. The type of 
information that is of most relevance to the engineering 
industry is ‘trade secrets’. Trade secrets ‘... consist of 
items or collections of information which, because of 
their inaccessibility to the rest of industry, confer a 
competitive advantage on the firm which possesses or 
uses them’.6 Sometimes the confidential information 
may be the main asset of a business.  
 
The confidential information may be conveyed orally or 
in writing. It may take many different forms. In the 
engineering industry this would include, for example, 
technical and conceptual drawings, photographs of plant 
and equipment, designs of plant and equipment and 
scientific data relating to the work done by the 
company. Other relevant information for the 
engineering industry which may be subject to protection 
includes sources of supply, expansion plans, sales 
statistics and details contained in engineering company 
contracts, for example on prices and costs. It would also 
include information that is not in material form, such as 
plans and ideas discussed in informal meetings between 
engineering company employees, or between 
engineering company employees and other parties. Of 
course the statutory regimes relating to copyright, 
trademarks, designs and patents also offer protection, 
sometimes for technical reasons they are not available, 
and in any event none of them cover ideas.7 Here 
                                                 
                                                                            
3 The categories follow those set out by F. Gurry in his book 
Breach of Confidence (1998 reprint) 7-21 and Ch. V. 
4 Such as Argyll v Argyll [1967] 1 Ch. 302 which concerned 
the disclosure of marital secrets, i.e. the plaintiff’s intimate 
affairs, following an acrimonious separation. 
5 This was the information at the centre of the dispute in 
Talbot v General Television Corp Pty Ltd [1980] VR 224. 
6 Gurry, above n 3, 7.  
7 The legislation relating to copyright, designs, patents and 
trade marks is the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), Designs Act 2003 
(Cth), Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the Trade Marks Act 1995 
breach of confidence may be the only legal action 
available to protect the information.  
 
A wide range of information is covered. Technical 
secrets were the issue in the Saltman Engineering Case. 
Saltman Co, the plaintiff, had conceived the idea for 
some leather punches, and it asked another company to 
draw up plans for the punches. The second company 
instructed a third company, the defendant, to 
manufacture the dies in accordance with the plans 
provided by the second company. The defendant 
company then used the information to make leather 
punches for sale by themselves. The plaintiff was 
successful in a breach of confidence action. In Ansell 
Rubber Co Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd8 the 
court protected information relating to the design, 
construction and operation of a machine for 
manufacturing rubber gloves. These two cases clearly 
indicate that protection will be given to information 
about new kinds of plant or equipment that are being 
used by a engineering company, and even to 
information about new ways of using plant and 
equipment already in existence.  
 
Business secrets were the issue in Rob v Green.9 The 
information concerned the customer list of the 
plaintiff’s business. Although the information was 
available in public directories, the defendant was not 
allowed to take advantage of the labour undertaken by 
the plaintiff in compiling the lists. Surveys & Mining 
Ltd v Morrison10 was a case involving a geologist and a 
mining company. Confidential geological data had been 
made known to the geologist while he was employed as 
a consultant to the mining company. The geologist then 
rather hastily applied for certain mineral leases. In 
finding him liable for breach of confidence, the court 
 
(Cth). The case of Donoghue v Allied Newspapers [1938] Ch 
106, relating to an alleged breach of copyright, illustrates that 
there is no copyright protection in the idea alone. 
8 [1967] VR 37. 
9 [1895] 2 QB 315. Robb v Green is an English case. An 
example of a more contemporary Australian case is NP 
Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley (2001) 80 SASR 151. 
10 [1967] Qd R 470. 
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inferred that it was the unauthorised use of the 
confidential information which led to those particular 
mining lease applications.  
 
The legal requirements in a breach of confidence 
action 
The plaintiff, the engineering company, in a breach of 
confidence action must prove three things:11  
 
1. The information is confidential 
There are varying degrees of secrecy and the 
requirement for confidentiality is not limited to 
information that is known only to the two parties 
involved. Material that is in the public domain, or 
common knowledge, cannot be protected, but in some 
circumstances information can remain confidential even 
if a number of people know about it. Thus if a large 
group of employees of a engineering company are privy 
to the employer’s trade secrets for the purpose of their 
employment, the confidentiality of the information is 
not necessarily lost. Once a product is in the 
marketplace, however, breach of confidence can do 
nothing to prevent what is known as ‘reverse 
engineering’- the process of taking the product apart to 
determine its constituent parts.  
 
2. The information is communicated in confidence 
The person to whom the information is imparted must 
be aware that they are receiving it for ‘a limited 
purpose’.12 This may arise from a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties, for example from a 
contract. The contract may be a commercial agreement, 
such as a joint venture, or it may be a contract of 
employment. In Surveys & Mining Ltd v Morrison, 
discussed above, Campbell J said that the relationship ‘ 
... between a consulting geologist and the mining 
company which employs him must necessarily be one 
of complete confidence’.13  
                                                 
                                                
11 The three requirements were established by Megarry J in 
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47. 
12 See Gurry, above n 3, 113-114.  
13 [1967] Qd R 470, 473. 
 
Where there is no pre-existing legal relationship the test 
is whether the confidant was aware that the information 
was disclosed for ‘a limited purpose’. These situations 
will include the case where one of the parties 
negotiating a contract, which does not eventuate, 
discloses confidential information. In Coco v A N Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd14 the plaintiff had designed a moped 
engine and entered into negotiations with the defendant 
to manufacture the engine. The negotiations fell 
through, but the plaintiff claimed that the defendants 
used his design later on without his agreement. The 
court agreed that the circumstances were ‘redolent of 
trust and confidence’,15 but the plaintiff lost the case 
because the design was not different enough from 
information already in the public domain to be 
categorised as confidential.  
 
Certain difficulties arise where the confidential 
information comes into the hands of third parties. 
Where the third parties know that the information is 
confidential, they will be liable. In addition the third 
parties may be liable if they do not actually know the 
material is confidential, but they ought to know. In 
Surveys & Mining Ltd v Morison the associates of the 
defendant geologist, who were parties in the mineral 
lease applications, were also liable. The court fixed 
liability on the geologist’s associates because it was 
found that they knew that the defendant geologist was a 
consultant to the plaintiff company. Even if they did not 
actually know the information was confidential, they 
should have had some suspicion of its origins.  
 
The problem area is where a third party receives 
information, innocent of the fact that it is confidential, 
particularly when the information is paid for. Here the 
innocent third parties will be liable from the time they 
become aware that the information is confidential, 
 
14 [1969] RPC 41. 
15 ibid, 51, per Megarry J. 
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whether or not the information was paid for.16 The 
innocent third parties may be given actual notice that 
the information is confidential, for example in the form 
of a writ for breach of confidence, or notice might be 
imputed to them from circumstances subsequent to 
acquisition. 
 
3. There must be an unauthorised use of the information 
to the detriment of the plaintiff 
There are some theoretical arguments that it is necessary 
for the plaintiff to show detriment.17 In practice 
detriment may be shown by something as simple as hurt 
or embarrassment to the plaintiff. Detriment must, 
however, be shown in those cases where the 
government is the plaintiff,18 and when any plaintiff can 
raise evidence of material detriment, such as loss of 
profits, it will have an effect on the remedy granted. 
 
Defences 
One defence is ‘just cause or excuse’ where the 
disclosure may be justified because the defendant can 
show that the breach of confidence reveals an ‘iniquity’, 
such as fraudulent or criminal behaviour on the part of 
the plaintiff. Another defence is ‘legal compulsion’ 
where the confidant is obliged by law to divulge 
information, for example where a bank may be 
compelled by law to disclose information about a 
client’s earnings to the Commissioner of Taxation, or a 




The different remedies available to the successful 
plaintiff in a breach of confidence action allow for a 
range of alternative outcomes. 
                                                 
16 Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349, per Lord Denning, 361. 
Note that this is in contrast to the situation where the third 
parties knew or ought to have known from the outset that the 
information was confidential; here liability arises from the 
time of acquisition. 
17 For discussion see Gurry, above n 3, 407-408, and J. 
McKeough & A. Stewart, Intellectual Property in Australia 
(1997) 4.13.  




In many breach of confidence cases the plaintiff 
engineering company may not be seeking monetary 
compensation, but would rather keep the information 
out of the public domain altogether. This may be 
achieved by an injunction which is a court order either 
restraining the defendant from doing something or 
compelling the defendant to do something.  
 
2. Account of profits 
An account of profits is a remedy that strips the 
defendant of the profits made as a result of the 
infringement. Because of the difficulties associated with 
the remedy, not least of which is determining exactly 
how much profit, if any, the defendant made at the 
expense of the plaintiff, it is in fact little used. 
 
3. Damages 
Where there is a contract between the confider and 
confidant, damages are awarded for the breach of 
contract. Where there is no contract, the court seeks to 
return the plaintiff to the pre breach of confidence 
position. Damages may include past losses, future 
losses, loss of profits, or loss of royalty payments. 
Damages may also be awarded in addition to an 
injunction. 
 
4. Order to deliver up for destruction 
This is an unusual remedy where the court orders the 
defendant to hand over for destruction any goods 
resulting from the unauthorised use of the information. 
An example would be where a defendant makes tools or 
equipment following a confidential disclosure about a 
particular design or pattern and for some reason there is 
no copyright, design or patent coverage available. 
 
Contractual confidentiality (secrecy) clauses 
When dealing with another party, whether it is an 
employee, supplier, subcontractor or client, a good way 
for an engineering company to protect its confidential 
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information is by means of a confidentiality or secrecy 
clause in a contract. Such a clause can be part of a larger 
contract, for example a contract of employment or 
supply, or it can be the basis of the entire contract. 
Breach of the clause may enable the party wishing to 
enforce the covenant to sue in order to obtain an 
injunction, as discussed above, or damages. Great care 
must be taken when drawing up confidentiality clauses, 
however, because potentially a court may find them 
invalid as being a ‘restraint of trade’. 
 
Contracts or covenants in restraint of trade 
Historically contracts or covenants in restraint of trade 
were void (unenforceable). The common law regarded 
them as being contrary to public policy because they 
were anti-competitive and encouraged the existence of 
monopolies, but over time this position has been relaxed 
to some extent.19 Nowadays when a confidentiality 
contract, or confidentiality clause in a contract, comes 
before the court the starting point is that it will be 
treated as unenforceable unless it can be shown to be 
‘reasonable’.  
 
Where the confidentiality covenant restricts an 
individual’s ability to earn a living, for example, a 
clause in an employment contract restraining the 
employee after s/he leaves that particular employment, 
it is more difficult to show that the restraint is 
‘reasonable’. This is exemplified by Buckley v Tutty,20 a 
case that does not relate to confidentiality clauses but to 
employment contracts generally. Here the High Court 
found that the Rugby Football League rules which 
restricted a professional rugby league player from 
moving freely between clubs were in restraint of trade 
and invalid. Where the confidentiality covenant restricts 
the employee’s ability to divulge secrets during the 
course of that particular employment it is more likely to 
be enforceable. Even where there is no express 
confidentiality covenant in the contract the court may 
                                                 
                                                
19 Australian Contract Law Reporter (1991-2004) 62, 903. 
20 (1971) 125 CLR 353. 
imply one. This proposition was suggested in the case 
of Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler21 where the English 
Court of Appeal said, ‘While the employee remains in 
the employment of the employer the obligations are 
included in the implied term which imposes a duty of 
good faith or fidelity on the employee’. 
 
One of the important factors to be taken into account by 
a court when determining the validity of a 
confidentiality covenant is the ‘protection of those 
whose bargaining power is weak against being forced 
by those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter 
into bargains that are unconscionable’.22 The potential 
for a bargain to be unconscionable is obvious in the 
employer/employee relationship, but not so obvious in a 
business relationship. The leading case in this area, and 
one which discusses issues relating to the determination 
of what is ‘reasonable’, is the case of Nordenfelt v 
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd.23 The 
defendant Nordenfelt was a well known manufacturer of 
guns with worldwide sales. He sold his business to the 
plaintiff company, covenanting in the sale contract that 
he would ‘not for 25 years, if the company so long 
continued to carry on business, engage, except on behalf 
of the company, either directly or indirectly, in the trade 
or business of a manufacturer of guns, gun mountings or 
carriages, gunpowder explosives or ammunition, or in 
any business competing or liable to compete in any way 
with that for the time being carried on by the company.’ 
The English House of Lords found all but the last part to 
be valid, applying the following reasoning: 
 
Restraints of trade and interferences with 
individual liberty of action may be justified by 
the special circumstances of a particular case. 
It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is 
the only justification, if the restriction is 
reasonable – reasonable in reference to the 
interests of the parties concerned and 
reasonable in reference to the interests of the 
public, so framed and guarded as to afford 
 
21 [1986] 1 All ER 617, 625. 
22 Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macauley [1974] 1 
WLR 1308, 1315, per Lord Diplock. 
23 [1894] AC 535. 
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adequate protection to the party in whose 
favour it is imposed, while at the same time it 
is in no way injurious to the public.24
 
Two recent cases have provided interesting examples of 
how the law operates. In Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele 
Australia Pty Ltd25 the plaintiff Maggbury filed 
applications under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) for 
patents of inventions relating to foldaway ironing 
boards. Thereafter Maggbury sought commercial 
partners for development of the inventions, and started 
discussions with the defendant Hafele whose parent 
company was located in Germany. Before allowing the 
defendants to inspect the prototypes, Maggbury insisted 
on the execution between the parties of a ‘Deed of 
Confidentiality’ which included the following clauses: 
 
5.6 Hafele [Australia] shall not at any time 
hereafter use the Information for any purpose 
whatsoever except with the Inventor’s 
informed prior written consent. 
 
11 ‘Duration’ 
It is a condition of this agreement that Hafele 
[Australia] will forever observe the obligations 
of confidence set out in this Agreement, unless 
released from such obligations in writing by 
the Inventor. 
 
Shortly afterwards Maggbury exhibited the foldaway 
ironing boards at trade fairs in Sydney and Melbourne. 
The negotiations between Maggbury and Hafele 
eventually failed and no commercialisation agreement 
resulted. Maggbury later became aware that Hafele had 
begun distributing in Australia wall-mounted foldaway 
ironing boards, and manufacturing in Germany wall-
mounted and drawer-mounted ironing boards.  
 
Maggbury sued Hafele in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland and the trial judge, Byrne J, found for the 
plaintiff, awarding $25,000 in damages and granting an 
injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing 
and distributing the wall mounted ironing board. 
Hafele’s appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal was 
                                                 
                                                
24 ibid, 565, per Lord Macnaghten. 
25 (2001) 210 CLR 181. 
successful, the court reducing damages to $5,000 and 
setting aside the injunction. This was done on the basis 
that ‘the agreement not to use information is 
unenforceable, because it has no time limit and it covers 
all information whether or not publicly disclosed … No 
injunction should be granted under the general law, 
because the information has been made public, so far as 
it is of significant value’.26 The appeal by Maggbury to 
the High Court was dismissed by a three to two 
majority. In a joint judgment Gleeson CJ, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ found the provisions to be a restraint of trade 
because ‘[t]hey restrict the liberty of the Hafele 
companies in the future to conduct their operations and 
dealings with third parties in such manner as they think 
fit.’27 The majority went on to say: 
 
The fact that the restraint can be said to have 
freely bargained for by the parties to the 
contract provides no sufficient reason for 
concluding that the doctrine should not apply. 
All contractual restraints can be said to be of 
that character. 
 
The result is that the doctrine applied to the 
restraints as we have identified and rendered 
them invalid, subject to their justification as 
reasonable in the interests of the public and 
parties. The respondents correctly emphasise 
that such an enterprise was not undertaken at 
trial. Further, it may be added that there would 
be substantial difficulty in doing so.28
 
Kirby J, in a powerful dissenting judgment made the 
following points:  
 
Hafele freely negotiated the agreements with 
Maggbury. The contracting parties were at 
arm’s length. This is not a case where 
advantage was taken of Hafele as a party in a 
vulnerable economic position. Indeed, Hafele 
was in a much stronger economic situation 
than Maggbury. Both parties to the 
confidentiality agreements were advised by 
lawyers and other experts. Hafele executed the 
agreements with its eyes wide open.  
 
On the face of things, this was therefore a case 
where Hafele, having agreed to explicit, 
 
26 ibid, 195. 
27 ibid, 202. 
28 ibid, 203. 
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limited and particular restrictions on the use it 
could make of ‘the Information’, proceeded, in 
clear breach of its covenants, to do exactly 
what it had promised not to do.29
 
In an equally powerful dissenting judgment, Callinan J, 
like Kirby J, would have allowed the appeal and 
restored the judgment and order of the trial judge. It is 
difficult not to agree with the sentiments expressed 
above in the judgment of Kirby J, and to have some 
sympathy for the plaintiff, Maggbury, caught between 
two stools as it were. Because the information 
Maggbury had been trying to keep secret had been 
revealed in the patent application and at the trade fairs, 
the first requirement in a breach of confidence action 
(that the information is confidential) could not proved. 
In the majority judgment because the confidentiality 
covenant was a restraint of trade, and Maggbury had not 
introduced evidence to show it to be ‘reasonable’, it was 
unenforceable. Even if Maggbury had produced such 
evidence, the majority judgment had intimated that it 
had been too widely drawn (by using words such as 
‘forever’) and they would have still found the contract 
to be void as a restraint of trade.  
 
AIM Maintenance Ltd v Brunt30 concerned an 
employment contract between the plaintiff, AIM 
Maintenance, and the defendants Brunt and Jenkins. 
The case was an application in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia before Roberts-Smith J for an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain, inter alia, the 
defendants from using the plaintiff’s trade secrets or 
confidential information. The plaintiff designed and 
manufactured gearboxes and pumps for mining 
machinery, and the business involved a number of trade 
secrets. Brunt was initially employed as a fitter, then 
later as an engineering supervisor. Jenkins was 
employed as foreman and supervisor of the plaintiff’s 
workshop personnel. There were areas of significant 
factual dispute, including whether the defendants had in 
fact signed the plaintiff’s ‘Intellectual Property 
                                                 
                                                29 ibid, 205 and 206 respectively. 
30 [2004] WASC 49 (26 March 2004). 
Assignment Agreement’ and ‘Confidentiality 
Agreement’, but for the purposes of granting an 
injunction Roberts-Smith J felt only that he needed ‘to 
assess whether or not there is a serious issue to be tried 
on the basis of the issues pleaded and as to which there 
is evidence from the plaintiff.’31  
 
The plaintiff considered the sort of confidential 
information to which the defendants were exposed 
included pricing structures and pricing arrangements 
with customers, technical knowledge, details of AIM’s 
customers including their needs, work projects and 
existing contracts. The two main clients of the plaintiff 
were Lightnin Mixers Pty Ltd and National-Oilwell Pty 
Ltd. In January 2004 the defendants resigned at short 
notice and almost immediately solicited business from 
Lightnin and National, business which at the time was 
conducted with the plaintiff and the conduct of which 
involved the plaintiff’s trade secrets. The loss of these 
clients would eventually cause the failure of the plaintiff 
company, whereas the new business of the defendants 
was not dependent on these customers, nor would the 
injunction that had been applied for stop them from 
carrying on their business with other customers. Finding 
that it was sufficiently arguable that there was a serious 
question to be tried, and that the balance of convenience 
fell in favour of the plaintiff, Roberts-Smith J granted 
the injunction.  
 
Recommendations 
The AIM case demonstrates that a well drawn 
confidentiality clause in an employment contract will 
provide an employer with some protection 
notwithstanding some factual disputes, at least until the 
trial proper can take place. When drafting a 
confidentiality covenant, be it a clause in a larger 
contract or the substance of an entire contract, care must 
be taken to ensure it is ‘reasonable’. Any time frame 
must be one that is tailored to the needs of each 
covenant, bearing in mind that such a covenant in an 
 
31 ibid, 21. 
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employment contract is likely be construed more strictly 
by the courts than one in a commercial contract between 
parties of equal bargaining power. The Maggbury case 
shows that even the latter must be drawn up with 
caution. Framing a time limit that roughly coincides 
with the period it would take to reverse engineer the 
product (or the information) would assist in a finding 
that the covenant is reasonable in that respect.  
engineering company. While information is secondary 
to the main focus of an engineering company’s 
operations, the seepage of confidential information with 
an intrinsic value will ultimately have an effect on 
competitiveness and viability. 
 
Covenants as to geographical exclusions, for example, 
one that the employee must not work within 20 (or 50 or 
100) kilometres of the present employer’s place of 
business, must also be carefully structured to the needs 
of each individual covenant. The temptation to include 
broad brush statements (‘world wide’, ‘forever’) to 
ensure all contingencies are covered must be resisted if 
the covenant is to have any chance of being enforceable. 
 
Conclusion 
Breach of confidence applies to the engineering industry 
in many ways, and where the information is an idea 
rather than something in material form, breach of 
confidence may provide the only avenue of legal 
protection. The usefulness to the engineering industry of 
this relatively unknown legal action should not be 
underestimated. As well as breach of confidence, a well 
drafted confidentiality covenant will assist in preventing 
the disclosure of trade secrets by employees, contractors 
and the like, providing of course that the ‘restraint’ will 
only be enforceable if it is reasonable ‘by the special 
circumstances of a particular case’.32 Maggbury v 
Hafele has demonstrated that even in the twenty first 
century, and between two parties on an equal footing, a 
restraint clause containing words like ‘forever’ will not 
be reasonable.  
 
Breach of confidence and confidentiality covenants both 
have great potential to protect the economic worth of 
valuable information relating to the business of an 
                                                 
32 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co 
Ltd. [1894] AC 535, 565, per Lord Macnaghten. 
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